双随机、一公开消防监管模式的演化博弈分析

doi:10.16265/j.cnki.issn 1003-3033.2020.12.019

中国安全科学学报 ›› 2020, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (12): 133-140.doi: 10.16265/j.cnki.issn 1003-3033.2020.12.019

双随机、一公开消防监管模式的演化博弈分析

刘纪达, 康宁, 安实教授, 麦强^** 副教授

哈尔滨工业大学经济与管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨 150001

收稿日期:2020-09-08 修回日期:2020-11-10 出版日期:2020-12-28 发布日期:2021-07-15
通讯作者: **麦强(1977—),男,甘肃天水人,博士,副教授、博士生导师,主要从事系统工程方面的研究。E-mail: maiqiang@hit.edu.cn。
作者简介:刘纪达 (1993—),男,黑龙江哈尔滨人,博士研究生,主要研究方向为消防监督管理。E-mail:kittadada@yeah.net。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助(51578199,71974045)。

Evolutionary game analysis on fire supervision model of two random selections and one information publicity

LIU Jida, KANG Ning, AN Shi, MAI Qiang

School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin Heilongjiang 150001, Chin

Received:2020-09-08 Revised:2020-11-10 Online:2020-12-28 Published:2021-07-15

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为厘清消防部门与经营单位在双随机、一公开消防监管中策略行为的演化过程和影响因素,构建双随机、一公开消防监管模型。基于演化博弈理论,在消防部门与经营单位具有有限理性的假设下,分析双随机、一公开监管中消防部门与经营单位策略选择性,并仿真分析不同参数对演化结果的影响。研究表明:消防部门与经营单位间的演化系统主要趋向于3种演化稳定策略和1种周期性波动的混合策略。当消防部门的抽查力度、追责损失、声誉收益增大,监督抽查成本减小时,消防部门倾向选择积极监管策略;当经营单位行政处罚、火灾事故、社会声誉损失越大时,经营单位会选择安全经营策略。

关键词: 双随机、一公开, 消防监管, 演化博弈, 监督抽查, 消防执法

Abstract: In order to clarify evolutionary process and influencing factors of strategic behaviors of fire department and business units in two random selection and one information publicity fire supervision, a fire supervision model was constructed. Then, stability of the two parties' strategy selection in such supervision was analyzed based on evolutionary game theory under an assumption that fire department and business units have limited rationality. Then, effects of different parameters on evolution results were analyzed through simulation. The research show that evolutionary system between two parties mainly tends to be three evolutionary stability strategies and one hybrid strategy with periodic fluctuations. When fire department's inspection efforts, accountability losses, reputation gains increase, and cost of supervision and random inspection decrease, it prefers to adopt an active supervision strategy. When administrative penalties, fire accidents, and social reputation losses of business units increase, they will choose a safe business strategy.

Key words: two random selection and one information publicity, fire supervision, evolutionary game, supervision and random inspection, fire enforcement

中图分类号:

X913

刘纪达, 康宁, 安实, 麦强. 双随机、一公开消防监管模式的演化博弈分析[J]. 中国安全科学学报, 2020, 30(12): 133-140.

LIU Jida, KANG Ning, AN Shi, MAI Qiang. Evolutionary game analysis on fire supervision model of two random selections and one information publicity[J]. China Safety Science Journal, 2020, 30(12): 133-140.

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双随机、一公开消防监管模式的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary game analysis on fire supervision model of two random selections and one information publicity

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